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I.  INTRODUCTION 
During every trial, the court’s goal should be to ensure that no party is 
unfairly prejudiced by an inaccurate damage award.  Courts seek to ensure 
that verdicts accurately and justly reflect the evidence presented to the jury, 
and do not result in a miscarriage of justice by awarding a nominal amount 
to a party who has suffered greatly.1  Disproportionate damage awards can 
arise for various reasons, including inadequate jury instructions2 or 
 
 *  B.A. English, University of Kentucky, 2008; J.D. anticipated 2014 Northern Kentucky 
University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law.  Special thanks to my family. 
 **  Director of Center for Excellence in Advocacy and Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky 
University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law. 
 1.  See Holmes v. City of Massillon, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Generally, 
when a district court determines that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that court has a 
duty to grant a new trial in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”); see also Sanders v. Green, 
208 F. Supp. 873, 878–79 (E.D. S.C. 1962) (granting new trial on damages where jury’s award was 
“grossly inadequate”). 
 2.   See, e.g., Pryor v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s 
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ambiguity on the verdict forms.3  In these instances, the court is empowered 
to order a new trial based solely on damages if such an order would rectify 
the injustice of the original damage award. 
Federal Rule 59(a) allows trial courts to grant new trials to any or all of 
the parties, on any or all of the issues.4  However, it “does not specify the 
grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted,”5 or how courts 
should address situations where it is impossible to have a new trial on 
damages alone without also including evidence and testimony relating to 
other issues from the first trial.6  The vague language of the Rule fails to 
articulate whether, in a new trial based only on damages, evidence relating 
to other issues should be allowed if it relates to the issue of damages, or if a 
new trial on all issues must be ordered when the issue of damages is too 
intertwined with other aspects of the first trial.7  Because Rule 59(a) gives 
courts the broad power to grant partial new trials, on one or all of the issues, 
the circuits have had to determine how best to apply this broad rule where 
the issue of damages is closely related to other issues, such as liability. 
Circuits are split as to whether to adopt the Stand Alone approach or the 
Semi-Inclusive approach.8  Where the issue of damages is so interwoven 
with other issues, some courts have applied the Stand Alone approach, 
allowing a new trial when the issue of damages is completely independent 
from that of liability and where it is clear that the error as to the damage 
award did not in any way affect the determination of liability.9  The rationale 
behind this approach is that it prevents partial new trials “where a tangled or 
complex fact situation would make it unfair to one party to determine 
damages apart from liability.”10  Further, it is appropriate for a court to grant 
a partial new trial only when it is plain that the error as to one element of the 
verdict did not in any way affect the determination of the other issues.11  
Courts adopting this approach have done so with the goal of avoiding 
limited new trials where a confusing set of facts would make it unfair to one 
 
order for a new trial where the jury instructions were “confusing and misleading”); Allred v. Maersk 
Line, Ltd., 35 F.3d 139, 140 (4th Cir. 1994) (remanding for new trial on damages due to an error in 
the jury instructions); McElroy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 506 F. Supp. 1211, 1220 (W.D. Pa. 1981) 
(awarding a new trial limited to damages where defendant was entitled to an adverse inference 
instruction). 
 3.   See, e.g., Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the jury verdict 
forms were clearly ambiguous as to the amount of the total damages award). 
 4.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). 
 5.  Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 6.  See FED. R.  CIV. P. 59(a). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.   See infra Part III. 
 9.  See, e.g., Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454–55 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 10.  Id. at 455. 
 11.  Id. (citing Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 758 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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party to determine damages apart from liability.12  Further, this approach 
aims to eliminate situations where there might be reason to think that a 
verdict represents a compromise among disagreeing jurors as to liability.13 
Conversely, other courts have applied the Semi-Inclusive approach, 
allowing a new trial on damages only, even where the issue of damages is 
closely intertwined with that of liability, but permitting both parties to 
present evidence from the liability phase of the first trial, as long as that 
evidence is relevant to the issue of damages.14  Additionally, under this 
approach, the judge will “apply a broad standard with respect to the 
relevance of this sort of evidence[,] and there shall be a strong presumption 
that evidence from the liability phase might be relevant” to the issue of 
damages.15  The rationale behind this approach is that it prevents the inherent 
problems and injustices that can arise when “a new jury addresses damage 
questions without knowledge of the evidence introduced in the liability 
phase of the trial.”16 
Federal Rule 59(a) is written broadly, and authorizes courts to grant a 
new trial to any party, on any issue.17  In 59(a) cases, even where the 
question of error is not confined to damages, courts should not deprive a 
party from receiving a partial new trial.  In these situations, an appropriate 
solution is to confine the trial to damages, while allowing each party to 
present evidence from the first trial that is relevant to the original jury’s 
determination of damages.  This will allow the second jury to fairly evaluate 
the factors necessary to either uphold, or rectify, the original damage award.  
Therefore, the Semi-Inclusive approach is most consistent with the general 
standards of the Federal Rules and most adequately safeguards the parties 
from prejudice. 
This Article argues that courts should adopt the Semi-Inclusive 
approach to ensure that, in trials based solely on damages, both parties are 
able to present evidence that is relevant to and supportive of their arguments.  
Part II of this Article describes the background, purpose, and past 
interpretations of Rule 59.18  Part III of this Article illustrates the application 
 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See, e.g., Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 181 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.   FED. R.  CIV. P. 59(a). 
 18.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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of the two approaches.19  Part IV analyzes and demonstrates the positive and 
negative aspects of each.20  It finds that the Semi-Inclusive approach is 
preferred because it safeguards against any injustice that might occur when 
one party is precluded from presenting evidence that might be crucial to its 
case and is most consistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59(a).21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Text and Overview 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides: 
(1) Grounds for New Trial.  The court may, on motion, grant a new 
trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—as follows: 
(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal 
court . . . .22 
Rule 59 gives district courts broad discretion in granting new trials.23  
Further, when an appellate court remands a cause for a new trial because of 
error, the court may limit the scope of the trial to the assessment of 
damages.24  Courts should base a decision on whether to grant a new trial on 
their assessment of the fairness of the first trial and the reliability of the 
jury’s verdict.25  Therefore, courts considering the question of whether to 
allow a new trial based only on damages must base their decision on whether 
a limited new trial would be fair to the parties.26 
B.  Standard of Review 
Rule 59 does not enumerate specific grounds upon which a new trial 
may be granted.27  Historically recognized grounds include, but are not 
 
 19.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 20.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 21.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22.  FED. R.  CIV. P. 59(a). 
 23.  Schramm v. Long Island R.R., 857 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D. N.Y. 1994) (“Rule 59(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vests with the district courts considerable discretion in ordering a 
new trial.”). 
 24.  See Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 335 F.3d 466, 475 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 25.  Seidman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1991); Wellogix, Inc. v. 
Accenture, LLP, 823 F. Supp. 2d 555, 571 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 26.  See Wellogix, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
 27.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
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limited to: claims that “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the 
damages awarded are excessive, [or that] the trial was unfair.”28  The district 
court must weigh the evidence as the court saw it and set aside the jury’s 
verdict where “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.”29  
Further, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury’s verdict.30  The verdict must be upheld unless the evidence points so 
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the other party that the court 
believes that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary conclusion.31  
The absolute lack of evidence to support a jury’s verdict makes refusal to 
grant a new trial an error of law.32 
Apart from an inadequate damages award, a party might move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(a) because the jury either relied too heavily on faulty 
witness testimony,33 or failed to properly consider reliable witness 
testimony.34  As described by the Second Circuit in Raedle v. Credit 
Agricole Indosuez: 
 On new trial motions, the trial judge may weigh the evidence and 
the credibility of witnesses and need not view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict winner.  However . . . trial judges 
must exercise their ability to weigh credibility with caution and 
great restraint, as a judge should rarely disturb a jury’s evaluation of 
a witness’s credibility, and may not freely substitute his or her 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury simply 
because the judge disagrees with the jury.  [Moreover] . . . [w]here 
 
 28.  Seidman, 923 F.2d at 1140 (quoting Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 
(5th Cir. 1985)); see also Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007); 11 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2805 (2d ed. 1995). 
 29.  Molski, 481 F.3d at 729. 
 30.  Song v. Ives Labs, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] trial judge hearing a 
motion for a new trial ‘is free to weigh the evidence himself and need not view it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict winner.’”) (quoting Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 684 (2d Cir. 1983)); 
Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he district court weighs all 
the evidence, but need not view it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). 
 31.  Wellogix, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 571; Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., 804 F. Supp. 
137, 141 (D. Kan. 1992); see also DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (“A court considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial . . . should only grant such a 
motion when the jury’s verdict is egregious.”). 
 32.  Molski, 481 F.3d at 729; Urti v. Transp. Commercial Corp. 479 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 33.  Antevski v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 4 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1993) (“If a 
verdict is based on false testimony, the district judge has the discretion under Rule 59 to grant the 
injured party a new trial.”). 
 34.   See Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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the resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the 
credibility of the witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from 
setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.35 
Trial courts’ broad power to grant a Rule 59(a) motion can serve to 
remedy an unjust result in one trial; however, it can also produce tension 
between the parties’ Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury and the 
district court’s power to set aside an erroneous verdict based on the weight 
of the evidence.36  This tension seems to be at its peak in cases where “the 
result turns [mostly] on the credibility of a single witness.”37  Although the 
trial judge may substitute his or her view of the evidence for that of the jury, 
the judge must be convinced that the verdict is seriously erroneous and will 
result in a miscarriage of justice.38 
The bottom line in Rule 59(a) cases is that a jury verdict should rarely 
be disturbed.39  Rule 59 “affords trial courts latitude in reviewing jury 
verdicts and in considering [witness] credibility.”40  However, where “a 
verdict is predicated almost entirely on the jury’s assessments of credibility, 
such a verdict generally should not be disturbed except in an egregious 
case.”41 
C.  Gasoline Products v. Champlin Refining Co. 
In Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., the United States 
Supreme Court acknowledged the different approaches and interpretations 
that the circuits could apply in deciding whether to allow a new trial based 
solely on damages.42  In that case, the petitioner sued in district court for 
royalties alleged to be due under a contract with the respondent.43  The 
contract licensed the respondent to use two “Cross cracking units,” which 
were structures used in increasing the production of gasoline from crude 
oil.44  The respondent pleaded, in a counterclaim consisting of two counts, a 
contract by the petitioner to construct a “Cross vapor treating tower,” which 
would treat gasoline produced by the cracking units and was necessary to 
 
 35.  Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 418–19. 
 39.  Id. at 418. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  283 U.S. 494, 496–97 (1931). 
 43.  Id. at 495. 
 44.  Id. 
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make it marketable.45  The consideration of this contract was alleged to be 
the execution of the license contract at issue, as well as two related 
contracts.46  Parties admitted performance under these contracts.47 
The first count of the respondent’s counterclaim “alleged a contract 
arising from an oral proposal by the petitioner’s vice president . . . to 
construct for respondent a Cross vapor system treating tower.48  
Additionally, the respondent was to repay the petitioner for the cost of the 
tower if the tower functioned in a satisfactory manner.49  The second count 
of the respondent’s counterclaim alleged a written proposal similar to the 
oral proposal that the respondent accepted and confirmed by the execution of 
the other contracts.50 
The counterclaim charged that, because the petitioner failed to construct 
the treating system, and because the respondent had not yet been able to 
construct a substitute system, the respondent was forced to store large 
quantities of the cracked gasoline awaiting treatment.51  This resulted in four 
principal items of damage to the respondent: (1) “the expenses of the 
storage;” (2) “depreciation of the gasoline by evaporation and other causes;” 
(3) “the loss incident to shutting down respondent’s plant because of the lack 
of treating apparatus;” and (4) “the loss of anticipated profits from the sale 
of gasoline.”52 
The jury returned a verdict on both the petitioner’s action and on the 
respondent’s counterclaim, “leaving a balance in the petitioner’s favor for 
which the District Court gave judgment.”53  The First Circuit reversed 
because of errors with respect to the amount of damages on the counterclaim 
and restricted the issues in the new trial solely to the determination of 
damages.54  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to review whether the 
First Circuit erred in limiting the new trial to damages only.55 
The petitioner argued that if the new jury were not allowed to consider 
the issue of liability on the contract set up in the counterclaim, the court 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 495–96. 
 48.  Id. at 496. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 497. 
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would be denying him his Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a trial 
by jury.56  Although there was no practice at common law of setting aside a 
verdict in part, many states modified that rule to permit a new trial on less 
than all of the issues of fact, as long as the issues were clearly separable.57  
Further, the Court stated that the significance of the right to a trial by jury is 
that the issues of fact be submitted for determination with appropriate 
instruction and guidance to the jury.58  Additionally, the Court noted that 
“the Seventh Amendment does not exact the retention of the old forms of 
procedure,” “prohibit the [use] of new methods for ascertaining what facts 
are in issue,” or require that, when one issue has been determined in 
accordance with the Constitution, it be tried a second time just because 
another issue was decided erroneously.59 
Consequently, the Court held that, where the requirement of a jury trial 
has been satisfied by a verdict as to one issue of fact, that requirement does 
not compel a new trial of that issue just because another, separate issue is to 
be tried again.60  Based on that reasoning, the Court stated that, because the 
issues arising from the petitioner’s cause of action on the royalty contract 
were separable from the other issues, and the verdict as to those issues was 
free from error, it need not be disturbed.61 
The issue remaining for the Court’s consideration was whether the issue 
of damages was so separate from the others, arising from the counterclaim, 
that it could be tried separately.62  The Court acknowledged that the verdict 
on the counterclaim could have been taken to establish the existence of the 
contract and its breach; however, in the new trial, the jury was unable to 
remedy the amount of damages unless also advised of the terms of the 
contract.63  Additionally, the dates of the formation and breach were possibly 
material because it would be open to the petitioner to insist upon the duty of 
the respondent to minimize damages.64  However, the contract and 
counterclaim differed as to the dates of formation and breach, and as to the 
number of towers that were to be constructed.65 
Therefore, the Court held that the issue of damages was “so interwoven 
with that of liability” that the question of damages could not be submitted to 
the jury independently without causing confusion and uncertainty and 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 497–98. 
 58.  Id. at 498. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 499. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 499–500. 
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resulting in an unfair trial.66  The Court stated that “[t]here should be a new 
trial of all the issues raised by the counterclaim.”67 
Although Gasoline Products deals more with the constitutional 
questions that arise from a new trial based on Rule 59(a), it provides some 
insight into the rationale behind the Stand Alone approach.  This case 
effectively counters the argument that allowing a new trial on only one issue 
unconstitutionally deprives one party of its right to a jury trial.  It does so by 
illustrating the purpose of the Seventh Amendment, which is to allow issues 
to be considered by a jury that has been provided instructions from the court 
that will facilitate effective deliberation and analysis under the principles of 
law. 
Most importantly for purposes of this article, Gasoline Products 
effectively illustrates the Stand Alone approach and problems that can arise 
when a new jury is asked to decide one issue in a case involving many 
complicated aspects.  It demonstrates the close proximity that damages and 
liability will likely have in most cases.  Although this article argues that the 
Semi-Inclusive approach is most effective,68 Gasoline Products presents 
helpful insight into the Stand Alone approach by showing how difficult it 
would be for a new jury to fairly evaluate an erroneous damage award 
without information leading up to that decision.69  The verdict as to the 
respondent’s counterclaim seemed to validate the assertion that a contract 
existed, and that the petitioner breached it.70  The Court recognized that the 
issues of liability and damages were inextricably intertwined.71 
Gasoline Products effectively communicates the difficulties in 
evaluating damages alone in a new trial, which lead some circuits to apply 
the Stand Alone approach.  However, the Semi-Inclusive approach 
effectively remedies those difficulties. 
III.  THE STAND ALONE APPROACH VS. THE SEMI-INCLUSIVE APPROACH 
Circuits are split as to whether it is better to apply a broad or narrow 
standard in Rule 59(a) cases.72  Under the narrow Stand Alone approach, a 
 
 66.  Id. at 500. 
 67.  Id. at 501. 
 68.  See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
 69.  See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500. 
 70.  See id. at 499–500. 
 71.  Id. at 500. 
 72.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
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new trial on damages alone will be allowed only if the issue of damages is 
completely separate from any other issue.73  This means that the new jury 
must be able to effectively remedy an erroneous damage amount without the 
aid of evidence from any other aspect of the first trial.74 
Under the broad Semi-Inclusive approach, a new trial based only on 
damages will be allowed, even if the damage award is closely intertwined 
with another issue—such as liability—that is not being re-tried.75  There, the 
new jury is allowed to hear evidence from other aspects of the first trial, as 
long as it has something to do with the issue of damages.76 
A.  The Stand Alone Approach 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided in 
Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, that it would apply the Stand Alone approach in Rule 
59(a) cases.77  Under this approach, new trials based solely on damages are 
allowed in situations where the issue of damages stands completely alone 
and separate from any other issue, and, therefore, no evidence relating to any 
other aspect of the first trial is necessary or admissible.78 
The plaintiff, Raymond T. Pryer, was an inmate at a state prison and 
claimed that the defendant guards subjected him to excessive force.79  Pryer, 
proceeding pro se, introduced medical records documenting his injuries and 
testified without dispute as to the injuries he sustained.80  In the initial trial, 
the court failed to inform the jury that it could award damages for intangible 
harms, including emotional pain and humiliation.81  Additionally, the court 
instructed the jury that, if Pryer failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he suffered any actual damages, the jury must return an award 
of nominal damages.82  Although the jury found that some of the guards 
acted reasonably, it also determined that four of the guards were liable, and 
awarded Pryer nominal damages.83 
The district court ordered a new trial on its own motion on the issue of 
damages only.84  The court ruled that “the jury’s verdict on damages was 
 
 73.  Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 181 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  251 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 78.  Id. at 454–55. 
 79.  Id. at 450–51. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 451. 
 82.  Id. at 452. 
 83.  Id. at 449, 452. 
 84.  Id. at 449–50, 452.  Additionally, it is reasonable to assert that the language in Rule 59 
allowing for a new trial on any motion applies to motions made by parties.  Allowing a court to grant 
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against the weight of the evidence,” and ordered a new trial to “avoid a 
miscarriage of justice.”85  The court ruled that its instructions to the jury as 
to compensatory and nominal damages were inadequate and erroneous.86 
During the second trial, the focus was solely on the damages caused to 
Pryer, and he testified at length.87  At the conclusion of the second trial, the 
jury awarded Pryer $300,000 in compensatory damages.88 
In response, the guards moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, to 
reduce the amount of the verdict.89  After the district court denied their 
motion, the guards appealed the trial court’s order for a new trial limited 
solely to damages,90 arguing that the issues of liability and damages were so 
interrelated that a new trial should not have been ordered unless it was to be 
extended to all issues.91 
In deciding whether to grant a partial new trial on damages, the Third 
Circuit stated that its ruling would be guided by the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. and provided 
three reasons for its holding.92  First, the Third Circuit recognized that the 
incident at issue involved an entangled fact situation where both sides 
vehemently denied liability.93  Both sides introduced witnesses who testified 
that the other side was at fault, and Pryer produced detailed medical 
records.94  Second, the Third Circuit stated that the injuries detailed in 
Pryer’s medical records could be a result of the guards’ use of reasonable 
force, their excessive use of force, or even Pryer’s own actions.95  
Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that it would be impossible to 
determine from the record whether Pryer’s injuries were caused by excessive 
force, reasonable force, Pryer’s own actions, or some combination of these 
possibilities.96  Third, the Third Circuit acknowledged that a jury, when 
assessing damages, must know the exact factual background as to how a 
 
a new trial on its own motion seems to undermine the very purpose of Rule 59. 
 85.  Id. at 452. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 452–53. 
 91.  Id. at 454. 
 92.  Id. at 454–56. 
 93.  Id. at 455. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 456. 
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party’s injuries occurred and who caused those injuries.97 
Here, the court held that it was not clearly apparent that the issues of 
damages and liability were so distinct and separate that a trial based solely 
on damages could be had without injustice.98  Further, the Third Circuit 
expressly declined to adopt the Semi-Inclusive approach, allowing new trials 
on only damages with cautionary instructions to the second jury.99  Upon 
concluding that it would be impossible for a second jury to fairly determine 
the extent of Pryer’s injuries without also fully understanding the manner in 
which the guards’ actions caused the injuries, the Third Circuit followed the 
Gasoline Products standard and held that a new trial was necessary on all 
issues.100 
B.  The Semi-Inclusive Approach 
Although the Stand Alone approach effectively eliminates many 
frivolous new trials, some circuits have adopted the Semi-Inclusive approach 
in hopes of providing a less rigid standard of applying Rule 59(a).101  The 
Semi-Inclusive approach allows some evidence from other aspects of the 
first trial to be admitted if they are related to the issue of damages; however, 
it does not open the floodgates to allow in any and every issue from the first 
trial just because a party might want to present it to the new jury.102 
In Watts v. Laurent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit applied a more relaxed approach in determining what evidence is 
admissible during a new trial on the issue of damages alone.103  Applying the 
Semi-Inclusive approach, the Seventh Circuit allows both parties to present 
evidence relating to issues other than damages in the second trial, as long as 
the evidence is somehow related to the damages issue.104 
The plaintiff, Jeffrey Watts, was an inmate at a youth correctional 
facility.105  He sued several employees at the facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging violation of his constitutional rights.106  Watts’s claim stemmed 
from an incident wherein another inmate allegedly attacked Watts while he 
and other residents were running toward their housing unit.107  Watts testified 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 457. 
 99.  Id. at 458. 
 100.  See id. 
 101.  See, e.g., Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 181 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 102.  See id. at 181. 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 170. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 171. 
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that many of the inmates at the facility were involved in gangs, and that the 
inmate who attacked him was the “chief” of one of the gangs.108  Watts 
theorized that the inmate attacked him because his continued refusal to join a 
gang undermined the inmate’s authority as a gang “chief.”109  Watts also 
presented evidence that the four employees overheard the inmate threatening 
him.110 
During the trial, the employees were concerned that the jury would find 
a defendant liable merely because he or she was joined to another defendant 
against whom the evidence was stronger.111  In response to this concern, the 
trial court instructed the jury: 
 [A]lthough there is more than one defendant in this action, it 
does not follow from that fact that if one is liable that they are all 
liable.  Each one is entitled to a fair consideration of his own 
defense and is not to be prejudiced by the fact . . . that you may find 
against one or more of the others.  The instructions govern the case 
as to each defendant insofar as they’re applicable to him or to her, 
to the same effect as if he or she were the only defendant in the case 
and . . . you will decide each defendant’s case separately as if it 
were a separate lawsuit.112 
The trial court also agreed to use separate verdict forms for each 
employee.113  The jury awarded Watts compensatory damages, and filled in 
$40,000 on the verdict form for each individual defendant.114  A district 
judge then entered judgment for Watts against each of the defendants for 
$40,000 individually.115 
After the verdict, the employees filed a joint motion to clarify the 
judgment, maintaining that the jury had intended to award Watts $40,000 in 
damages against all of the defendants together, as opposed to the judge’s 
interpretation that the jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000 from each 
individual employee for a total judgment of $200,000.116  The district court 
 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 175. 
 112.  Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting jury instructions). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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judge who heard this case agreed with the employees.117  The court then 
vacated the earlier judgment and stated that the employees were together 
liable to Watts for a total of $40,000.118 
On appeal, Watts argued that the face of the verdict forms clearly 
showed the jury’s intent that he be awarded $40,000 from each employee 
individually.119  The employees argued, however, that the verdict forms 
clearly showed that the jury thought Watts’s damages amounted to $40,000, 
and awarded only that amount in total.120  The Seventh Circuit held that 
Watts could obtain a new trial on damages if he chose because the issue of 
damages was ambiguously presented to the jury.121 
In granting Watts a new trial, the Seventh Circuit recognized the 
injustice that can arise in new trials based only on damages.122  To avoid 
those problems, the court stated that the parties should be able to present 
whatever evidence from the liability phase is also relevant to the issue of 
damages, and that the trial judge should apply a broad standard in assessing 
the relevancy of evidence from the liability phase to the issue of damages.123  
Further, during the new trial, there must be a strong presumption that 
evidence from the liability phase is relevant to the issue of damages, and the 
new jury is to be instructed that the relevant issues of liability have already 
been decided.124  However, the Seventh Circuit stated that these instructions 
are not to preclude the presentation of evidence from the liability phase to 
the extent that such evidence is relevant to damages.125 
The Seventh Circuit based its reasoning on the Gasoline Products Stand 
Alone approach on the prior Seventh Circuit decision of MCI 
Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.126  In MCI 
Communications Corp., the court stated that new trials on damages, rather 
than liability, “must be grounded upon a clear understanding between the 
court and the parties of the issues and proof involved in each phase of the 
trial.”127  Further, the court acknowledged that “the most difficult part of the 
decision to remand for a partial new trial on damages is the formulation of 
rules to guide such a proceeding.”128  In a partial new trial on damages, it is 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 176. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 181. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 127.  Id. at 1168. 
 128.  Id. 
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critical to realize that the issues of liability, jurisdiction, and immunity have 
not been remanded and are not subject to further review.129 
However, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it is sometimes 
necessary to educate the second trial’s fact finder on issues such as liability, 
even though the second trial is only on damages.130  In these instances, 
evidence that might be associated with the determination of liability may be 
introduced or reintroduced.131 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Analysis of the Stand Alone Approach 
There are two arguments favoring the Stand Alone approach.  First, the 
Stand Alone approach discourages courts from granting partial new trials in 
cases where all of the issues are inextricably intertwined.132  This narrow 
approach seeks to prevent prejudice that can arise when a new jury is not 
allowed to consider the substantial impact that liability can have on the 
amount of a damage award.133  However, the counterargument is that such a 
narrow standard could prevent the moving party from getting a fair 
evaluation of an erroneous damage award.134  If the amount of damages 
awarded is truly unfair, a party might be precluded from obtaining a new 
trial simply because the issue of liability was significantly related to the 
damages award.135 
The second argument for the Stand Alone approach is that it allows for a 
new trial on only one issue without including numerous pieces of extraneous 
evidence from the first trial.136  This is especially helpful in cases where the 
first verdict might have been the result of poor jury instructions, or cases like 
Pryer where the plaintiff is a convicted felon who suffered severe physical 
injury.137  In those instances, the second jury is able to narrowly evaluate the 
 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499–500 (1931); Pryer v. C.O. 
3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454–55 (3d Cir.  2001). 
 133.  See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 499–500; Pryer, 251 F.3d at 455. 
 134.  See Pryer, 251 F.3d at 460 (Mansmann J., dissenting) (citing Wheatley v. Beetar, 637 F.2d 
863, 867–68 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 135.  See id. at 460–61 (Mansmann J., dissenting). 
 136.  See id. at 455. 
 137.  Pryer, 251 F.3d 448. 
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sole issue of damages without being influenced by testimony from experts or 
by one party’s background.138  It presumably is the most efficient approach 
because fewer issues must be retried to the new jury. 
Some courts use a two- or three-prong test to aid in determining whether 
to grant a new trial limited solely to the issue of damages.139  For instance, a 
court might hold that a new trial on damages is allowed only where: “(1) the 
question of liability was not intertwined with the question of damages and 
(2) the issue of liability was either (a) not contested or (b) had been fairly 
determined so that no substantial complaint could be made with respect [to 
the ultimate finding of liability].”140 
However, while preventing a rush of frivolous partial new trials, the 
Stand Alone approach risks imposing requirements so rigid that partial new 
trials could become impossible to obtain altogether.141  Consider a case in 
which a plaintiff is injured in a car accident and is awarded only nominal 
damages.  In a jurisdiction that applies the Stand Alone approach, one or 
both of the parties might be prejudiced if denied the opportunity to have a 
partial new trial because of a connection between the damage award and 
another issue.142  For instance, if the first jury decided to award the plaintiff 
nominal damages because he was intoxicated and driving recklessly, the 
judge might decline to grant a partial new trial because the damage award 
was intertwined with the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.143  
 
 138.  But cf. Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing plaintiffs’ argument 
that new trial based on damages was necessary because jury’s award of nominal damages reflected 
its bias against plaintiffs’ status as prisoners, but ultimately deciding that a new trial was not 
warranted because “plaintiffs’ prisoner status [was] not the only explanation for the jury’s award”). 
 139.  Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Propriety of Limiting to Issue of Damages Alone New Trial 
Granted on Ground of Inadequacy of Damages, 5 A.L.R. 5TH 875, 899–900 (1992). 
 140.  Id. at 900. 
 141.  Cf. Pryer, 251 F.3d at 460–61, 461 n.8 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (citing Olsen v. Correiro, 
No. 92–10961–PBS, 1995 WL 62101, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 1995) (explaining the 
interconnectedness of the issues of liability and damages, and noting that, as a practical matter, 
“[t]he universal requirement of a causal link between liability and damages means that the issues can 
never be completely unlinked”). 
 142.  Cf. Wheatley v. Beetar, 637 F.2d 863, 867–68 (2d Cir. 1980). 
Defendant, here has had a fair trial on the issue of liability and it would be . . . grossly 
unfair to plaintiff, as well as contrary to the spirit of F.R. 59, to require a retrial of the 
question of defendant’s culpability which has already been decided by the jury in 
plaintiff’s favor.  Moreover . . . a grave injustice would occur to a plaintiff if, having 
submitted the question of liability to a jury, and having obtained a favorable verdict, a 
plaintiff should be compelled to risk another trial, with a possibility of an adverse 
verdict, solely because a jury failed to take into consideration all of the elements of 
damage as clearly instructed by the Court. 
Id. (quoting Yates v. Dann, 11 F.R.D. 386, 394 (D.Del. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143.  Cf., e.g., Hatfield v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 396 F.2d 721, 723–24 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(explaining that the nominal damage award indicated “confusion on the part of the jury with regard 
to the contributory negligence issue,” that there had been a “contaminat[ion of] the entire verdict,” 
and that the interconnectedness of the issues of liability and damages “require[d] a new trial of all 
03 BALES SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:18 PM 
[Vol. 40: 625, 2013] The Damage Is Done 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
641 
If this results in remand for a new trial on all issues, the defendant might be 
unfairly affected because the second jury will get to hear about all of the 
issues from the first trial and might completely reverse the original verdict.  
Therefore, what began as a dispute over the sole issue of damages could 
result in a complete reversal of liability. 
The Stand Alone approach could result in a windfall for undeserving 
parties.  This possibility calls into question whether there is really a fair or 
accurate assessment of the issue of damages in circuits that apply the Stand 
Alone approach in granting new trials. 
B.  Analysis of the Semi-Inclusive Approach 
Two arguments favor the Semi-Inclusive approach.  The first is that it 
allows both parties to present the necessary evidence from the liability phase 
of the trial to aid the second jury in determining the correct appropriation of 
damages.144  However, the Semi-Inclusive approach also might allow the 
second jury to hear extraneous evidence in trials that are intended to be 
confined to one issue alone.145  This could result in the moving party getting 
a second trial on all issues, which could unfairly punish the opposing party. 
Second, the Semi-Inclusive approach strikes a “happy medium,” 
allowing both parties an equal chance at submitting relevant evidence 
without repeating the first trial unnecessarily.146  While the Stand Alone 
approach permits a partial new trial only when the issue of damages is 
completely separate from all other issues, the Semi-Inclusive approach 
permits both parties to submit evidence and testimony from the first trial, as 
long as it is relevant to the issue of damages.147  The application of this 
relaxed standard seems to remedy some of the flaws that result from the 
Stand Alone approach,148 but not without creating some of its own.  By 
allowing both sides to present evidence from the first trial, it might become 
impossible to ever truly have a new trial based solely on one issue.  The 
 
the issues”). 
 144.   See Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 181 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 145.  Cf. id. (describing an ostensibly liberal process whereby “[t]he trial judge shall apply a broad 
standard with respect to the relevance of . . . evidence and there shall be a strong presumption that 
evidence from the liability phase may be relevant in some way to damages”). 
 146.  See Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff proffering this same 
idea in furtherance of his argument that the Third Circuit adopt the semi-inclusive approach).  Cf. id. 
at 460 (Mansmann, J. dissenting) (discussing the importance of limited retrials to judicial economy). 
 147.  See Watts, 774 F.2d at 181. 
 148.  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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circuits applying the Semi-Inclusive approach risk opening the door to any 
evidence in any way related to the issue of the second trial, no matter how 
tenuously connected.149 
For instance, in a medical malpractice case where the plaintiff is 
awarded nominal damages after claiming that he was injured during surgery, 
the plaintiff can argue under the Semi-Inclusive approach that the injury 
made him miss work and he is entitled to lost wages.  The plaintiff could 
argue that lost wages are a form of damages, so this evidence must be 
admissible.  He could further argue that evidence relating to his 
psychological and emotional state should be admitted because it would 
relate to damages for emotional distress. 
Similarly, the physician could argue that evidence relating to the 
plaintiff’s medical history, as well as any evidence and testimony relating to 
the actual surgery, should be admitted because it relates to the amount that 
the surgeon may owe the plaintiff.  While this might not seem to be 
prejudicial to either party, this outcome defeats the purpose of Rule 59(a) 
because it results in what resembles a completely new trial on all of the 
issues—not just the one that the court ordered. 
C.  Analysis of Both Approaches and Proposal 
Although both approaches aim to ensure that partial new trials do not 
center around facts where liability and damages are confusingly intertwined, 
the Stand Alone approach described in Gasoline Products150 does not 
remedy the issue most effectively for two reasons.  First, by denying partial 
new trials whenever the issue of damages is in any way related to the 
determination of liability, or of other issues, one or both parties to an action 
might be unfairly prejudiced.151  Second, the new jury might not be able to 
accurately assess whether a damage award is erroneous without information 
relating to liability or other aspects of the first trial.152 
Neither the Stand Alone approach nor the Semi-Inclusive approach is 
flawless.  Both have the potential to produce results that seem to be outside 
the purpose of Rule 59(a).153  However, the Semi-Inclusive approach is the 
best choice for two reasons.  First, it is consistent with the general standard 
courts use to apply 59(a).  In those general cases, courts look at the evidence 
presented at the trial to assess whether error occurred in the verdict.  That 
 
 149.  Cf. Watts, 774 F.2d at 181 (calling for “the free presentation of evidence and information 
from the liability phase to the extent such evidence is relevant . . . in any way” (emphasis added)). 
 150.  See supra Part II.C. 
 151.  See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 153.  See supra notes 142, 149 and accompanying text. 
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should also be the approach when the only issue is damages.  Second, the 
Semi-Inclusive approach allows both parties to present evidence relevant to 
the original damage award, which will likely give the second jury a clearer 
picture of the reasoning that led to the allegedly erroneous amount.  This 
will benefit both parties by increasing the chance that the second jury will 
have all the information necessary to make an informed, accurate judgment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Rule 59(a) gives courts the authority to order a new trial on any or all of 
the issues.154  When the only issue is damages, courts have taken two 
approaches.  Some courts have adopted the narrow Stand Alone approach 
that allows a new trial on damages alone only when the issue of damages is 
completely separate from liability.155  Other courts have adopted the broad 
Semi-Inclusive approach that allows evidence relating to other aspects of the 
first trial to be admitted, as long as it is relevant to the damage issue.156 
The Semi-Inclusive approach is the more favorable of the two 
approaches.  In allowing parties to present evidence from other aspects of 
the trial that might be crucial to their cases, the Semi-Inclusive approach 
safeguards against one party being prejudiced due to the new jury’s lack of 




 154.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). 
 155.   See supra Part III.A. 
 156.  See supra Part III.B. 
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